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Firms can increase profitability by appropriately motivating managers. We investigate drivers of managerialmotivation, and propose how firms can use performance pay to alter motivational patterns. We focus on
the agent’s optimal effort decision in trading off compensation utility with effort cost in a static and dynamic
setting. Surprisingly, we find that lower risk aversion or increased pay are not necessarily motivating factors,
and identify the relevant effort drivers underlying the agent’s utility and compensation plan. We characterize
properties of agents’ preferences for output lotteries (risk aversion, aggressiveness, prudence) that trigger sys-
tematic motivational patterns with respect to a variety of factors, such as the agent’s productivity and past
performance, time to evaluation, the firm’s capabilities, and market factors. Our insights are robust, holding
under very general modeling assumptions on preferences, rewards, and the stochastic effort-output function.
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History : Accepted by David E. Bell, decision analysis; received November 9, 2005. This paper was with the
authors 1 week for 1 revision.
1. Introduction
According to a new Hewitt1 global study, 2006 will
mark an “increased activity in the area of variable
pay, as companies rely more on bonuses as a pri-
mary means of attracting, motivating, and retaining
key talent” (Business Wire 2005). For example, the
Bank of America offers performance-based contracts
to all employees because “incentive pay makes people
work harder,” just as Alpharma Inc. puts more money
into incentive compensation because they “have seen
a connection between company performance and
employee incentive” (Wall Street Journal 2004, p. D1).2
Bonus pay is typically tied to corporate profitability,
either in an egalitarian structure, or a “meritocracy”
that differentiates employees based on their quarterly
or annual performance. According to Hewitt, “com-
panies are putting more focus on the notion of per-
formance, and they’re willing to spend    more on
bonus pay when the results justify it.” To determine
performance, firms look at a wide array of measures,
ranging from objective sales targets, to customer sat-
isfaction ratings, all the way to subjective assessment
of interpersonal effectiveness.
Recognizing the value of top performing employ-
ees, firms are “making special efforts to    keep
them engaged in their work and the company, as well
as appropriately rewarded,” Hewitt reports. In the
1 Hewitt Associates is a global HR consultancy.
2 Subsequent quotes are from this article, unless otherwise stated.
effort to better understand and manage the firm’s
human resources, this research proposes to investi-
gate, from a rational agent perspective, the drivers
of managerial motivation, defined as the “willingness
to exert effort to achieve the organization’s goals”
(Coulter and Robbins 1999). Specifically, we focus
on the optimized decisions of a manager, so-called
agent, whose motivation is measured by the level
of effort expended into his work activity, when the
firm offers a particular performance-based contract.
We analyze what intrinsic and extrinsic factors influ-
ence the managers’ effort, and what properties of the
agent’s preferences and reward structure lead to spe-
cific motivational patterns.
The managerial compensation literature has studied
these issues primarily in the context of a principal-
agent framework.3 Agency models focus on designing
optimal compensation from the firm’s profit per-
spective, with the agent’s motivational drivers as a
by-product. In contrast, this paper focuses on the
agent’s response problem: we zoom on the individual
manager and describe his optimal behavior under a
given (but general) contract.
Our investigation is relevant to organizations seek-
ing to better understand how employees react to exist-
ing or proposed compensation plans, and how their
motivation is affected by various factors (e.g., the
3 See Salanié (1997) for a comprehensive treatment and Prendergast
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agent’s attitude toward risk, market factors, a pro-
jected change in compensation, etc.). For example, a
firm may believe that by increasing salary or total
compensation by five percent, it will motivate its
managers to work harder. Our results (§4) show that
the opposite may be true, and explain when this is
the case. We do not prescribe, however, the optimal
package to offer.
In reality, firms offer contracts that are not always
optimal or responsive to the environment. This is
in part because optimal contracts (as prescribed by
agency theory) are overly complex, and need to
adjust (optimally) in response to the myriad of fac-
tors affecting the firm’s profits. While this is theoret-
ically desirable, it is not always practical. Even if a
firm offered optimal contracts, these would typically
be set for extended periods (e.g., one year). Our model
is particularly relevant during this time frame, when
changes in the working environment, market factors,
or interim performance affect the agent’s motivation,
but not his contract.
Surprisingly, little is known about the agent’s effort
response under given types of contracts. According to
Ross (2004, p. 208): “Unfortunately, the effort to char-
acterize [contract] optimality—often in highly specific
and parametric models—has crowded out the study
of the agent given specific contract forms of the sort
that are commonly observed in practice.”
This gap in the literature prompts the focus of our
work on the agent’s problem, within the classical
principal-agent model. We analyze how the agent’s
preferences, the firm’s policies, and market condi-
tions affect effort and profits, under given contract
structures. Focusing on the agent’s problem allows
for tractable analysis and strong comparative stat-
ics results under very general modeling assumptions
on preferences, rewards, and the effort-output func-
tion. This leads to robust insights characterizing moti-
vational patterns in response to given (but general)
incentive structures.
Our results are different from the principal-agent
literature, where the agent’s behavior is studied in
response to optimal compensation. In the agency
framework, changes in a given factor affect the
agent’s effort level not only directly (as in our model),
but also indirectly, by altering the agent’s contract
(optimally for the firm). Focusing on the agent’s prob-
lem allows us to separate these effects and obtain new,
interesting insights that hold under very general con-
ditions. In contrast, we find that insights arising from
existing (parametric) principal-agent models are not
robust, hence should be applied with caution to spe-
cific needs of an organization.
A common myth in managerial, particularly sales-
force, compensation is that motivation is related to
the agent’s degree of risk aversion. Indeed, previ-
ous results indicate that less risk averse agents exert
more effort when the agent’s risk aversion is wealth
independent (Lal and Srinivasan 1993). We show that
this relationship is not robust in the general case and
can be reversed, for example, when agents have lin-
ear plus exponential utility. In general, no systematic
effect of risk aversion on effort can be claimed. This
may partially explain inconsistent results on the rela-
tionship between risk aversion and optimal reward
structure found in empirical studies (e.g., Joseph and
Kalwani 1995). Our results indicate that, all else equal,
agents with higher marginal utility for wealth will
work harder, but those with lower risk aversion may
not. In particular, a comparison of marginal utilities
can predict who will work harder.
Our analysis of how reward plans impact effort
shows that a salary raise does not stimulate man-
agers to work harder. This may explain why “com-
panies are moving away from the traditional annual
pay raise in favor of beefing up the amount of money
earmarked for employee bonuses” (Wall Street Jour-
nal 2004, p. D1). Interestingly however, we find that
increasing variable pay may not be a good motiva-
tor either, unless agents exhibit so-called aggressive
preferences, i.e., their marginal utility is inelastic to
changes in wealth. There are no benefits, however,
in offering higher rewards to conservative agents (the
terms aggressive and conservative are formalized in
Definition 2). It is therefore important to elicit these
properties of the agent’s preferences before design-
ing compensation plans. In general, firms can induce
rational agents to work harder by offering lower but
steeper compensation plans (these need not convex-
ify the agent’s value function). This condition is also
necessary to induce motivation from a diverse work-
force, when performance, also referred to as output,
is unpredictable by the firm.
Factors that influence output have an indirect im-
pact on effort; these include the agent’s productivity
and past performance, the firm’s capabilities, as well
as market factors, such as price or risk. In this con-
text, we investigate which properties of the agent’s
reward-induced preferences for output (see Definition 1)
are relevant triggers of motivational patterns. We find
that agents with aggressive preferences for output are
motivated by their own and the firm’s productiv-
ity, contrary to conservative ones. Agents with risk-
seeking preferences for output expend more effort
in bigger markets, or when prices are lower (the
opposite holds in the risk-averse case). An increase
in market risk motivates agents with prudent out-
put preferences and demotivates imprudent ones (see
Definition 3). We also show that the corresponding
trigger properties of the agent’s preferences (risk seek-
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robust motivational pattern. Finally, we provide con-
ditions on the compensation plan to induce such pref-
erences for output.
The last part of this paper investigates how past
performance and evaluation horizon affect the agent’s
effort level in a dynamic setting, where variable com-
pensation is delivered based on cumulated output at
the end of a multiperiod horizon (year, quarter). We
identify the agent’s induced risk aversion for output
as the trigger property of consistent effort behavior.
Specifically, managers with risk-averse output pref-
erences (e.g., linear compensation plans) are unmo-
tivated by past successes (i.e., expend less effort the
better their achievements). Longer evaluation hori-
zons are not motivating for such agents, who tend
to procrastinate at the beginning of the evaluation
period and undertake more effort closer to bonus
time. Interestingly, these patterns can be reversed by
changing the reward function in a way that induces
risk seeking preferences for output.
1.1. Literature Review and Positioning
Our work is related to three main streams of liter-
ature in marketing (salesforce compensation), deci-
sion sciences (economic agent models), and finance
(executive compensation). A seminal paper in the
salesforce compensation literature is Basu et al.
(1985), who characterize the optimal contract in a
static principal-agent setting, with power utility and
gamma/binomial sales. They provide comparative
statics with respect to market uncertainty, salesforce
effectiveness, and production cost under linear con-
tracts. A wide range of variations and extensions have
been subsequently proposed, but few are related to
our work.4 Lal and Srinivasan (1993) extend Basu
et al. (1985) to a dynamic setting; their dynamic
problem is elegantly reduced to a static one due
to the exponential utility assumption. Dynamics are
also considered by Tapiero and Farley (1975) in a
multiproduct deterministic setting, and by Dearden
and Lilien (1990) in a two-period production learning
model. Reviews on salesforce compensation are due
to Coughlan and Sen (1989) and Coughlan (1993). The
insights from these parametric principal-agent models
are contrasted with the robust, nonparametric results
derived from our analysis of the agent’s problem.
In the decision analysis literature,5 a stream of work
related to ours considers the problem of an agent
who controls a risky distribution of losses by exert-
ing effort. Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985) show that
4 Most recently, a game theoretic model of salesforce compensation
was proposed by Misra et al. (2005), who provide empirical tests
of their theoretical hypotheses.
5 Sarin and Winkler (1980) provide empirically verifiable condi-
tions on the agent’s (multiattribute) preferences that induce certain
sound properties of managerial incentives.
the agent’s risk aversion has an ambiguous effect
on effort under a Binomial loss model. Jullien et al.
(1999) provide sufficient conditions on the risk dis-
tribution for higher risk aversion to induce higher
effort. Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005) determine pru-
dence as the key determinant of the agent’s optimal
effort behavior, in line with our results in §5. We pro-
vide a general, in-depth analysis of how the agent’s
preferences affect effort in §3.
Besides effort, another important aspect of the
agent’s output is risk. Optimal response to risk, under
various compensation schemes, is investigated from
an agent’s perspective by Gaba and Kalra (1999)
and Gaba et al. (2004), and, in a principal-agent
model, by Godes (2004). The financial literature has
extensively investigated the influence of nonlinear
contracts (typically convex options) on the agent’s
risk-taking behavior. In particular, Ross (2004) focuses
on the agent’s problem to derive conditions on utility
and reward plans to induce more or less risk-averse
behavior.
1.2. Structure and Framing
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The
main static model is presented in §2. Section 3 inves-
tigates the impact of the agent’s preferences on effort.
The motivational impact of pay structures is the sub-
ject of §4. Section 5 investigates comparative statics
with respect to factors affecting output, including the
agent’s and the firm’s productivity, and market fac-
tors. Section 6 extends the problem to a dynamic set-
ting and obtains insights with respect to the agent’s
past performance and time to evaluation. Section 7
concludes the paper.
Our model and results are applicable in contexts
where the agent is subject to any form of performance
pay, and effort is a strategic decision affecting the
agent’s performance or output. For simplicity, how-
ever, we focus the exposition of this paper on sales as
the sole pragmatic measure of the agent’s output; the
effort-output function refers to the sales response.
2. The Agent’s Static Problem
This section sets up the static model, our main as-
sumptions, basic notation. The agent’s preferences are
captured by a separable bi-criteria utility for wealth
w ∈ and effort x ∈ 01:6
wx=Uw−Cx
U represents the agent’s utility for wealth, assumed
increasing and concave (i.e., risk averse).7 The disu-
6 This can be interpreted as the percentage of effort devoted to the
sales activity. Alternatively, and at no loss of generality, x could be
defined in absolute terms over 0.
7 We use the terms negative, positive, increasing, and decreasing in
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tility or cost of effort C is positive, increasing, and
convex, with C0 = 0 and C1 =. Such a separa-
ble model is most common in the salesforce literature
(see, e.g., Basu et al. 1985, Lal and Staelin 1986).
The agent’s effort level decision x controls a ran-
dom output, also referred to as performance or sales
function Sx = sxY. The random variable Y cap-
tures exogenous factors (such as market forces) which
affect output, but are not under the agent’s control.
Throughout this paper we denote random variables
in bold. The riskless sales response function sxy
is assumed to be positive, increasing, and concave
in x. Concavity captures the diminishing marginal
impact of effort on output. Monotonicity implies that
the random sales response Sx is increasing in effort
in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance,8 i.e.,
higher levels of effort increase the probability of out-
put above any given level. Relevant special cases
include additively separable models Sx= f x+ Y,
with f increasing, or multiplicative models Sx= xY,
where Y is a positive random variable. In our model,
output can refer to either unit or dollar sales, depend-
ing on what the agent’s compensation is structured
around.
The compensation plan, r , also referred to as con-
tract or reward, typically consists of a fixed salary F
and a variable, sales dependent component v: rs=
F + vs, with v0 = 0.9 For example, the variable
part may be a linear commission  per unit sale,
vs= s, leading to a so-called linear contract. More
complex, commonly used (step/piecewise linear) con-
tracts involve a fixed bonus B for output above a
target F : vs= B1s≥F , or a commission rate  for out-
put above the target vs= s− +, or combinations
thereof. We denote 1A the indicator of the set A and
x+ =maxx0.




Let Rx denote the expected return from effort, i.e.,
Rx = ƐU rsxY and Wx = Rx − Cx, the
objective value in (1). We denote the optimal effort
level x∗ = argmaxx Wx, where, without loss of gen-
erality, the operator argmax refers to the largest max-
imizer (i.e., among equally appealing alternatives, the
agent chooses the maximum effort one).
A factor  is said to be motivating demotivating if
the agent’s optimal effort x∗ is increasing (decreas-
ing) in . A given control parameter  is motivat-
ing whenever the agent’s marginal return from effort
8 X dominates Y in the first order if ƐX≥ ƐY for all increas-
ing functions .
9 See Peck (1982) for a survey of compensation plans offered in
practice.
Rxx is increasing in  (partial derivatives are
denoted by corresponding subscripts). This marginal
return effect is the key driver of motivational pat-
terns. The next result follows from Topkis (1998, The-
orem 2.8.2).
Lemma 1. The agent’s optimal choice of effort x∗ is
increasing in the parameter , provided that his return
from effort, Rx, is supermodular in  and x.10
Throughout this paper, we identify trigger condi-
tions for the agent’s marginal return to increase in
response to a change in a given control factor , such
as the agent’s risk aversion, reward plan, productiv-
ity, past performance, or market factors. Lemma 1
ensures systematic motivational patterns. The follow-
ing concept will be relevant for characterizing system-
atic effects.
Definition 1. The agent’s reward-induced utility
for output is defined as the value function V =U 	 r .
This value function captures the agent’s reward-
induced preferences for output.
The agent’s preferences for wealth, captured by his
utility function U , induce via the reward plan r , pref-
erences for sales/output, captured by V . Faced with
the direct choice between two output (e.g., sales) lot-
teries S1 and S2, the agent will prefer the one that
gives higher expected value under V , i.e., higher com-
pensation utility. It is not that the agent cares for sales
per se, but he cares for sales in as much as they
determine his wealth. While the agent’s preferences
for money are intrinsic, preferences for output are
induced by compensation. For example, the agent is
naturally risk averse for wealth (U concave), but may
exhibit risk-seeking preferences among output lotter-
ies if the compensation offered by the firm induces V
to be convex.
2.1. The Firm’s Profit Problem
While this paper is primarily concerned with the
agent’s effort decision under a given contract, it is
important to understand how this indirectly affects
the firm’s profitability. In particular, when does a
higher level of effort translate into higher net profits
for the firm? In our setup, this is true as long as over-
all profits increase with the agent’s output level, i.e., if
the marginal return from output exceeds the marginal
cost of compensating the agent.
Assume for simplicity that output Sx is mea-
sured by contribution margin (similar results can be
derived for other output measures, such as volume).
The firm’s net profit from the agent expending effort
10 A bi-variate function gxy is supermodular if for all x2 ≥ x1,
y2 ≥ y1, gx2y2 − gx2y1 ≥ gx1y2 − gx1y1. If g is dif-
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level x, under the contract r , is x= Sx− rSx.
The next result insures that, for this given contract,
a higher level of effort increases the probability of
firm profits above any given level, and, in particular,
increases expected profits. All proofs are provided in
the appendix.
Remark 1. If s−rs is increasing in s, in particular,
if r ′ ≤ 1, then the firm’s net profit x is stochasti-
cally increasing in the agent’s effort level x. The con-
dition is also necessary for this to be true for any
increasing sales function s.
This condition states that compensation should not
be steeper than output itself, which is practically not
very restrictive. In particular, under a salary plus com-
mission contract, this means that commission is not
to exceed product margin, a necessary condition for
profitable compensation.
Remark 1 identifies a simple design condition that
aligns managerial effort and firm profits. In particular,
under such contracts, all our comparative statics for
effort translate into analogous results with respect to
firm profits. The condition, however, is not necessary
(hence not assumed) for the rest of the results in this
paper.
3. Impact of Agent’s Preferences on
Motivation
In this section, we investigate the impact of the
agent’s preferences on effort. In an agency framework,
Lal and Srinivasan (1993) show that the agent’s opti-
mal effort decreases in the degree of risk aversion for
an exponential utility model with linear contracts and
normally distributed sales.11 We first confirm these
results in the context of the agent’s problem under
exponential and power utility models with general
contract and sales functions. However, we show that
the insights are nonrobust, relying essentially on the
parametric form of the utility function, and, in partic-
ular, on the independence of risk aversion and wealth.
With general utility functions, we show that more
risk-averse agents do not necessarily work less (in
fact, the opposite can be true), and we determine the
appropriate property of the agent’s preferences that
acts as a systematic motivational driver.
We first remind some key concepts of risk aver-
sion (see Pratt 1964, Arrow 1965). An agent with util-
ity U is more risk averse than an agent with util-
ity u if U = g 	 u for a certain concave function g.
An agent exhibits increasing absolute risk aversion
11 In their agency framework, the profit maximizing firm seeks to
balance marginal net revenue from sales and marginal compen-
sation cost. Under their parametric model, the latter increases in
both effort and risk aversion, whereas the former is independent of
both. So, at higher levels of risk aversion, the firm has to decrease
marginal compensation cost, which is achieved by inducing a lower
effort (via a lower commission level).
(IARA) if he is more risk averse at higher wealth lev-
els, i.e., if for any ≥ 0, there exists a concave trans-
formation g such that Uw +  = gUw. If U is
twice differentiable, this amounts to the absolute risk
aversion coefficient AUw = −U ′′w/U ′w being
increasing. Decreasing/constant absolute risk aver-
sion (DARA/CARA) are defined similarly. Relative
risk aversion is a measure of risk aversion weighted
by the level of wealth, RUw=wAUw. Equivalently,
RU is the elasticity of the agent’s marginal utility,
U ′w. The concepts of monotone relative risk aver-
sion (IRRA/DRRA/CRRA) are defined by the mono-
tonicity of RUw in w.
3.1. Insights from Special Utility Classes
We investigate the effect of the agent’s degree of abso-
lute and relative risk aversion on optimal effort for
some relevant parametric utility classes. Assuming
compensation consists of a nonzero salary F > 0, plus





3.1.1. CARA Utility. To study the impact of the
degree of absolute risk aversion on optimal effort,
consider an agent with exponential (CARA) utility
function, Uw = 1 − e−w/", where " = A−1U w mea-
sures risk tolerance. The next result shows that the
optimal effort level x∗" is increasing in the risk tol-
erance " ∈ 01.
Remark 2. The optimal choice of effort for an agent
with CARA utility decreases in his degree of absolute
risk aversion.
3.1.2. CRRA Utility. To measure the effect of rel-
ative risk aversion on effort, consider an agent with
a power (CRRA) utility Uw = w". Higher " ∈ 01
corresponds to lower relative risk aversion. The next
result shows that x∗"= argmaxƐrsxY"−Cx
is increasing in ".
Remark 3. The optimal choice of effort for an agent
with CRRA utility decreases in his degree of relative
risk aversion.
Remarks 2 and 3 imply that the more risk averse
the agent is, the less effort he will put into his
sales activity. Both results, however, obtain from spe-
cial parametric utility classes that assume the agent’s
(absolute, relative) degree of risk aversion is indepen-
dent of wealth.
3.1.3. One-Switch Utility. To verify the robust-
ness of the above results beyond the above models,
consider an agent with a one-switch linear-exponen-
tial utility function (see Bell 1988), Uw=w− "e−#w,
#" > 0.12 This is DARA with AUw= #2"e−#w/1+
#"e−#w increasing in ", i.e., agents with higher " are
12 As wealth increases, the agent with one-switch utility can reverse
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more risk averse at any given wealth level w. In sharp
contrast with the results of Remarks 2 and 3, we show
that, with one-switch preferences, more risk-averse
agents actually work harder.
Remark 4. For agents with linear-exponential util-
ity Uw = w − "e−#w, at any given wealth level the
optimal effort is larger at higher levels of ", i.e., for
higher absolute risk aversion.
3.2. Motivating Preference Structures
So far we have considered parametric classes of utility
functions that insure a monotone (albeit not consis-
tent) relationship between risk aversion and effort. We
next investigate the robustness of such a relationship
under general utility functions. Contrary to previous
results in the literature, we show that lower risk aver-
sion does not necessarily induce the agent to exert
more effort, and we identify the appropriate condi-
tions to achieve that.
Consider two sales agents 1 and 2, with utility func-
tions U1w and U2w, and denote the correspond-
ing optimal effort levels by x∗1 and x
∗
2 , respectively.
Let $r be the space of all reward values achievable
with the contract r and any positive sales, i.e., $r=
r0.
Theorem 1. If U2 − U1 is increasing, then agent 2
expends more effort than agent 1, regardless of the reward
and sales function.13 Conversely, if for any increasing sales
function s, agent 2 exerts more effort than agent 1 under
the contract r , then U2 − U1 must be increasing on the
achievable rewards set $r.
From Lemma 1, the agent with higher marginal
return from effort works harder, i.e., x∗2 ≥ x∗1 . Higher
effort corresponds to higher rewards, i.e., more
wealth. Hence, agents with higher marginal value for
wealth are motivated to work harder. Indeed, the con-
dition of Theorem 1 can be restated as U2w + h −
U2w≥U1w+h−U1w for all w and all h> 0. The
second part of the result shows that higher marginal
utility is also a necessary condition for an agent to
work harder, regardless of the sales response. Hence,
motivational dominance among preferences is natu-
rally and robustly characterized by higher marginal
utility.
A direct consequence of Theorem 1 is that a risk-
averse agent with utility U works harder than a risk-
neutral agent, provided that Ux − x is increasing,
i.e., marginal utility exceeds unity. In general, con-
sider the transformation g that maps one agent’s util-
ity into the other’s, U2 = g 	U1. Theorem 1 states that
x∗2 ≥ x∗1 whenever g′ ≥ 1. This does not imply, nor is it
13 For a given a contract r and a sales function S, it is sufficient to
grant monotonicity of U2 −U1 on the domain of reward values w
that are achievable under this contract and sales function.
implied by convexity of g (which defines U2 as being
less risk averse than U1), explaining why the degree
of risk aversion has no robust, systematic impact on
effort. The following example illustrates a nonmono-
tone relationship between risk aversion and effort.
Example 1. Consider three sales agents with util-
ity functions U0w = #+ w, U1w = ln#+ w, and
U2w = ln# + w − e− ln#+w, # ≥ 1, so AU2 ≥ AU1 ≥
AU0 , i.e., agent 2 is more risk averse than agent 1 who
is more risk averse than (the risk-neutral) agent 0 at
any wealth level. However, both U2−U1 and U0−U1
are increasing, hence, x∗0 ≥ x∗1 and x∗2 ≥ x∗1 , i.e., agents
0 and 2 both work harder than agent 1.
Our results in this section focus on wealth prefer-
ences, but extend naturally for effort preferences. One
can similarly show that agents with lower marginal
disutility of effort work harder, and this is also a
necessary condition for the result to be robust with
respect to the sales response. This confirms and gen-
eralizes the insights of Lal and Srinivasan (1993), who
show that under a linear cost model, kC = kC, the
agent’s optimal effort choice decreases in k for k≥ 1.
4. The Impact of Compensation on
the Agent’s Motivation
Given that firms offer performance-based pay to moti-
vate agents, it is important to understand how prop-
erties of the compensation plan impact the optimal
effort level exerted by the agent. This is investi-
gated in the current section. We identify two sys-
tematic, but typically opposed motivational patterns
driven by reward structures: the wealth and marginal
reward effects. We further characterize properties of
the agent’s preferences under which increasing (or
decreasing) the agent’s variable, respectively, total,
compensation is motivating; these are linked to the
aggressiveness of the agent’s utility function.
4.1. Motivating Reward Structures
Fixed salaries, the most common type of compensa-
tion, fail to provide motivation for high performance.
Indeed, for a risk-averse agent, marginal return from
effort decreases as fixed salary increases (UF + h−
UF  is decreasing in F for concave U ), leading to
decreased effort levels (Lemma 1). We refer to this as
the wealth effect.
Proposition 1. The agent’s optimal choice of effort is
decreasing in the level of his fixed salary.
This suggests that to increase effort, firms should
offer the lowest salary acceptable by the agent, and
focus on variable compensation schemes to drive
motivation. The result is consistent with current
efforts by private and governmental organizations to
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to performance-based bonuses, as indicated in the
introduction.
While salary appears to be a systematic demo-
tivator, we investigate what transformations of the
reward plan systematically motivate managers. From
Lemma 1, the agent works more under a reward
plan, provided that his marginal return from effort is
higher. Because effort has a direct impact on sales, the
reward plan which ensures higher effort is the one
which induces a higher marginal value for output. We
refer to this as the marginal reward effect. Moreover,
this condition is necessary for the result to be robust
with respect to the sales response.
Proposition 2. Given two reward plans r1 and r2, if
U 	 r2−U 	 r1 is increasing, then the agent with utility U
always expends more effort under r2 than under r1. Con-
versely, if for any increasing sales function s, the agent
exerts higher effort under r2 than under r1, then U 	 r2 −
U 	 r1 must be increasing.
The conditions of Proposition 2 depend on the
agent’s utility function. When this is unknown to the
firm, the following conditions on the reward functions
induce any risk-averse agent to work more.
Theorem 2. If r2 ≤ r1 and r2 − r1 is increasing, then
all risk-averse agents expend more effort under r2 than
under r1. Conversely, if for any increasing sales function s,
all risk-averse agents exert higher effort under r2 than
under r1, then r2 ≤ r1 and r2− r1 is increasing.
Interestingly, the firm can induce the agent to work
more by actually paying him less, as long as his new
reward plan is steeper. Equivalently, the transforma-
tion g = r2 	 r−11 that maps r1 into r2, lies below and is
steeper than the identity line, i.e., gx≤ x and g′ ≥ 1.
In particular, Proposition 1 is a special case of the first
part of Theorem 2 with gx= x− F . An example of
such a transformation that also changes the slope of
the (piecewise-linear) contract is provided in Figure 1.
Figure 1 The Marginal Reward Effect: Contract 2 Is More Motivating
Than 1 at Any Level of Sales Because r2 ≤ r1 and r2 − r1















The results in this section characterize robust con-
ditions on the shape of the contract that motivate
agents to work harder. However, such prescriptions
may be difficult to follow in practice, either because
they require knowledge of the agent’s utility (Proposi-
tion 2) or they imply lowering the agent’s pay (Propo-
sitions 1 and Theorem 2). The latter is in contrast with
the “common wisdom” that an increase in variable
pay should motivate agents. The next sections pro-
vide conditions for this to be the case.
4.2. Magnitude of the Agent’s Total Pay
To assess the motivational impact of increasing the




where  captures the magnitude of the agent’s re-
turn. Increasing  results in a combined wealth and
marginal reward effect, which go in opposite direc-
tions. From Lemma 1, the agent is motivated by an
increase in the magnitude of his total reward, if his
marginal return from effort is increasing in . The
following dual properties of the agent’s preferences
formalize this effect; terminology is adapted from Liu
(2001).14
Definition 2. An agent with utility function U is
aggressive (conservative) if Uw+h−Uw, h>
0, is increasing (decreasing) in . If U is twice differ-
entiable, aggressiveness is equivalent to RU ≤ 1; con-
servativeness is captured by the opposite inequality.
Remark 5. Any conservative agent is risk averse.
Any risk-seeking agent is aggressive.
Aggressiveness means that the agent’s marginal
utility is inelastic with respect to changes in wealth
(relative risk aversion is the elasticity of U ′. In this
case, we show that the marginal reward effect from
a percentage increase in reward dominates the cor-
responding wealth effect. This suggests that increas-
ing pay works as a motivational tool for aggressive
agents. The opposite is true for conservative agents.
Moreover, these properties are necessary to obtain a
robust effort pattern, regardless of the sales response.
Theorem 3. The optimal choice of effort for an aggres-
sive (conservative) agent is increasing (decreasing) in the
magnitude of reward. Conversely, an agent whose optimal
choice of effort is increasing (decreasing) in the reward
magnitude for all increasing sales functions s, is aggressive
(conservative).
14 In a dynamic portfolio choice setting, Liu (2001) shows that
agents with relative risk aversion less than one invest more in the
risky asset, the shorter their investment horizon. He describes this
behavior and corresponding property as “aggressive.” The oppo-
site “conservative” behavior holds for investors with relative risk
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Figure 2 Optimal Effort Level vs. Magnitude 	 of Total Pay for Uw=
1− e−w , r s= 	s, Sx= x+Y, Where Y= 051055
0


















Several common concave utility functions, such as
power, exhibit aggressiveness. In general, however,
relative risk aversion is not uniformly less than one
and hence the optimal effort level is not always
increasing in the magnitude of reward. In a survey
of relative risk aversion, Meyer and Meyer (2005)
present mixed evidence of aggressive versus con-
servative behavior. However, they argue that a rea-
sonable property is IRRA, i.e., agents are initially
aggressive, and then become conservative as wealth
increases. In particular, for our model, this implies
that optimal effort is unimodal in the commission
rate: it increases as long as the agent is aggressive (rel-
ative risk aversion less than one), and decreases once
the agent becomes conservative. Such an example is
provided in Figure 2 with exponential utility. Discrete
distributions are denoted p(x, where x is the vector
of outcomes and p the corresponding probabilities.
4.3. Magnitude of the Variable Pay
Do larger bonuses motivate agents to work harder?
We next investigate how a percentage increase in vari-
able (as opposed to total) pay impacts the agent’s
effort. These results are also contingent on the agent’s
aggressiveness and conservatism, and are driven by
the preservation of these properties with respect to
shifts in wealth (induced by the fixed salary F ). The
following result holds for all types of agents, regard-
less of risk aversion.
Remark 6. For any utility function U and h ≥ 0,
consider the shifted utility Uw=Uh+w.
(a) If Uw is aggressive, then Uw is aggressive.
(b) If Uw is conservative and IARA, then Uw is
conservative.
This result allows us to characterize how opti-
mal effort x∗= argmaxƐU F +vsxY−Cx
changes with respect to the magnitude  of variable
reward.
Proposition 3. The optimal effort of an aggressive
agent increases in response to a percentage increase in the
variable portion of his reward. The opposite is true for a
conservative agent who exhibits IARA.
Figure 3 Optimal Effort Level vs. Magnitude 	 of Variable Pay for
Uw= w − e−w , r s= 1+ 	s, and the Same Sales











Intuitively, a percentage increase in variable pay
leads to the same marginal effect but a weaker wealth
effect than a same order increase in total reward (see
the previous section). Hence, aggressiveness remains
sufficient for higher variable pay to act as a motivator.
On the other hand, conservativeness is not enough to
counter the reward effect, as illustrated by the non-
monotone effort behavior in Figure 3, for one-switch
conservative (DARA) utility. IARA strengthens the
wealth effect (the agent’s utility becomes more con-
cave at higher wealth levels), and in combination with
conservativeness insures that increasing variable pay
is systematically demotivating.
5. Factors Affecting the Agent’s
Output
This section studies the impact of factors which influ-
ence the agent’s sales response on his optimal effort
choice. An increase in the agent’s or firm’s produc-
tivity, as well as changes in the marketplace, have an
influence on sales, and indirectly on the agent’s moti-
vation to exert effort. We identify conditions on the
agent’s induced preferences for output that lead to a
systematic effort behavior with respect to such factors.
Formally, consider an abstract performance factor 
that positively affects the sales response sxY ,
i.e., s is increasing in . The factor  has an indi-
rect impact on the agent’s optimal effort level x∗=
argmaxƐV sxY −Cx.
Certain structural parameters are consistent in
motivating agents regardless of their preferences,
such as, for example, the amount of responsibility
or workload (e.g., inventory) that the agent is allo-
cated. Given a workload level , the agent’s effective
output is given by minSx , and marginal return
from output increases in workload, hence the follow-
ing result:
Proposition 4. The agent’s optimal effort increases
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Yet few factors influencing output have such a
direct and consistent impact on effort. In general,
comparative statics results for x∗ are difficult to
obtain because of the compounded marginal effects of
the sales response and value function, and the inter-
actions between x and . A productivity factor  is one
that increases the marginal impact of effort on sales
(i.e., s is supermodular in x ). For such factors,
Lemma 1 implies that optimal effort x∗ increases
with  for V convex. The opposite, however, is not
necessarily true if V is concave, unless, e.g., the effect
of effort x and  are additively separable.
Further insights are derived from focusing on sep-
arable and multiplicative interactions. We investigate
(1) productivity factors that have a multiplicative
effect on overall sales, respectively, on the controllable
sales component (as controlled by the firm, respec-
tively agent: F , A), and (2) factors that influence
the uncontrollable market component in a general
stochastic way U . These effects are jointly formal-
ized in the following sales response model:
sxY= F Asx+YU  (3)
5.1. Productivity Factors
Several factors can enable the agent to generate more
sales at a given effort level. Factors controllable by the
firm, such as an improvement in brand or technology
or an increase in advertising, have a positive influ-
ence on the overall sales response. The parameter F
in model (3) captures such “firm productivity” fac-
tors.15 Sales are also conditioned by the agent’s own
productivity, as a result of past experience, familiarity
with the sales territory, etc. This impact, however, is
limited to the component of sales that is effectively
under the agent’s control. Such “agent productivity”
factors are captured by the parameter A in model (3),
with Y ≥ 0. As A or F increase, the agent is able to
generate higher sales for any given effort level x.
The agent’s aggressiveness/conservatism toward
sales V  captures the relationship between optimal
effort and productivity. The mechanics are analogous
to §§4.2 and 4.3, with sales preferences V replacing
wealth preferences U . The relevant insights can be
summarized as follows:
Proposition 5. (a) If an agent exhibits aggressive pref-
erences for sales, then his optimal effort increases in the
firm’s and his own productivity.
(b) If an agent exhibits conservative preferences for
sales, then his optimal effort decreases in the firm’s pro-
ductivity. Moreover, if the agent is also increasingly risk
averse for sales (V exhibits IARA), then optimal effort also
decreases in his productivity.
15 Our results hold more generally for sxY F = F Sx.
Both Lal and Srinivasan (1993) and Basu et al.
(1985) consider the impact of the agent’s productiv-
ity on the optimal choice of effort from a principal-
agent perspective. Basu et al. (1985) model the agent’s
productivity as the slope of the deterministic sales
response, and his utility with a power function for
which RU ≤ 1. They show that when the uncertainty
in sales is given by a binomial or gamma distribu-
tion, the agent’s optimal choice of effort increases in
his productivity. Lal and Srinivasan (1993) reach the
same conclusion with an exponential utility function.
Firms may fear that increased productivity would
allow agents to get lazier, as sales are easier to
achieve. However, if the firm offers rewards that
induce aggressive, in particular, risk-seeking prefer-
ences for sales, then the opposite behavior should be
expected. We next show how such behavior can be
induced through compensation.
5.1.1. Inducing Aggressive and Risk-Seeking
Behavior. With linear contracts rs = F + r · s, the
value function V inherits the properties of the agent’s
utility function U . Convex compensation plans, how-
ever, can induce risk-seeking behavior, even from
risk-averse agents. For strictly increasing, twice dif-
ferentiable contracts r , define qw = r−1w as the
amount of sales required for the agent to achieve
wealth level w. This is an increasing function for
which we abstractly define the corresponding mea-
sures of risk aversion. If the firm offers a contract such
that q =U , then the agent exhibits risk-neutral prefer-
ences for sales. The following conditions are necessary
and sufficient to induce risk-seeking, respectively,
aggressive attitudes toward sales.
Proposition 6. (a) The agent exhibits risk-seeking
preferences for sales (i.e., V is convex) if and only if Aq ≥
AU ; in particular, r needs to be convex.
(b) The agent exhibits aggressive preferences for sales if
and only if q′/q+Aq ≥AU .
The conditions AU ≤ Aq , respectively, AU ≤ q′/q +
Aq , are equivalent to q′/U ′, and, respectively, q′/qU ′
being logconcave.16 In particular, to induce aggressive
behavior toward sales, it is sufficient to offer convex
compensation plans r with q′/q ≥AU , i.e., 1/qU ′ log-
concave.
Example 2. Consider an agent with exponential
utility Uw= 1−e−w. The convex compensation plan
rs=− ln1− s", "≤ 1, induces aggressive behavior:
V s= s", so RV ≤ 1. For "= 12, the agent’s induced
preferences for sales are risk neutral, respectively, risk
seeking.
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5.2. Uncontrollable Market Factors
This section investigates the impact on effort of chang-
ing market conditions, which are outside the agent’s
control, captured by the factor  = U (indexing is
omitted henceforth) in (3), i.e.,
Sx = sx+Y (4)
In particular, we investigate the impact of exogenous
dynamics in market size, price, and risk on the effort
level expended by the agent. Risk aversion and pru-
dence toward output are identified as the relevant
triggers of systematic motivational patterns.
5.2.1. Market Size and Market Price. In this sec-
tion, the random, uncontrollable sales component
Y is assumed stochastically increasing under first-
order stochastic dominance in the “market size” .
That is, Y2 FSD Y1 for 2 ≥ 1. Hence, for a
given effort level x, sales are stochastically larger as
 increases. For example,  ≥ 0 may control average
sales: Y= +Y.
We show that agents with convex value functions V
are motivated by a bigger market size , while smaller
markets motivate agents with concave value func-
tions. This follows from Lemma 1, by observing that
concavity/convexity of V drive the monotonicity of
the agent’s marginal return from effort with respect
to . Furthermore, these properties are necessary to
robustly characterize the motivational impact of an
increase in market size.
Theorem 4. If the agent exhibits risk-averse (risk-seek-
ing) preferences for output, then his optimal choice of effort
decreases (increases) with market size. Conversely, if an
agent decreases (increases) his effort level in response to
any first-order increase in market size, then V is concave
(convex).
An alternative perspective on this result emerges
from interpreting market price as the driving factor
of both market size and effort. Let Sx p = f x −
gp + Y, where p is the product’s market price,
and f x, gp are increasing deterministic functions.
Sx p is stochastically decreasing in p under first-
order stochastic dominance. Theorem 4 implies that
agents with concave value functions V exert more
effort, the higher the market price, whereas convex
value functions reverse this behavior. Interestingly,
while demand for normal goods decreases in price,
this effect is countered by the additional impact of
price on effort, and the latter’s impact on sales. At the
extreme, if demand is not very price elastic, and the
agent has significant control over sales, sales can the-
oretically increase in price, as shown by the following
example (proved in the appendix).
Example 3. For an agent with V s = 1 − e−s ,
Cx= x, and sx pY = ex − ep + Y, the resulting
sales response is increasing in p.
5.2.2. Market Variability. This section investigates
which agents are motivated by riskier markets. To
capture the effects of market variability on the sales
response function (4), we assume that Y is stochas-
tically increasing in  under the convex order, i.e.,
Y2 CX Y1 for 2 ≥ 1.17 In other words, Y2
is riskier than Y1 in the (mean preserving spread)
sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 1971). As 
increases, sales are more variable at a given effort
level x. An example is Sx= x+ Y, with ƐY= 0
and  ≥ 0.
We find that the agent’s motivation from changes
in market risk is triggered by his prudence, formally
defined by Kimball (1990). A prudent agent increases
his precautionary savings in anticipation of future
risk. An equivalent, insightful characterization of pru-
dence in terms of risk apportionment is provided by
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2005). Intuitively, a pru-
dent agent prefers to disaggregate a sure loss from a
zero-mean risk.
Definition 3. An agent with utility function U is
said to be prudent (imprudent) if his marginal utility
Uw +  − Uw is convex (concave) in w for any
 > 0. If U is three times differentiable, prudence is
equivalent to U ′′′w≥ 0 U ′′′w≤ 0 for imprudence).
It is generally assumed that individuals exhibit pru-
dent behavior. Most common forms of utility func-
tions, like exponential, logarithmic, power, or Bell’s
one-switch utilities, exhibit prudence. Note the differ-
ence between prudence and risk aversion. Prudence
refers to the propensity of the decision maker to pre-
pare and forearm himself in the face of uncertainty,
whereas risk aversion measures how much the deci-
sion maker dislikes uncertainty and would turn away
from it if possible. In particular, the following rela-
tionships hold:
Remark 7. All DARA agents are prudent. All im-
prudent agents exhibit IARA.
In Kimball’s (1990) context of precautionary sav-
ings (see also Eeckhoudt and Gollier 2005), an agent
is prudent if an increase in future risk raises the
marginal value of wealth. Because higher marginal
return is motivating in our setting, the prudent agent
will expend more effort in response to an increase
in market risk. Moreover, prudence/imprudence are
necessary conditions for such behavior to be robust
with respect to the sales function.
Theorem 5. If the agent has prudent (imprudent) pref-
erences for sales, then his optimal choice of effort increases
(decreases) with the variability in the market. Conversely,
if for all increasing sales functions s, the agent’s optimal
17 X dominates Y in the convex order XCX Y if ƐX≥ ƐY
for all convex functions . If XCX Y, then ƐX= ƐY and VarX≥
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choice of effort is increasing (decreasing) in the market vari-
ability, then he is prudent (imprudent).
Interestingly, our results are in contrast with in-
sights previously obtained by Lal and Srinivasan
(1993) and Basu et al. (1985) who work with prudent
utility functions in a principal-agent setting. In their
models, however, a change in market variability leads
to a change in the agent’s optimal contract, which, in
turn, affects the agent’s effort behavior.
5.2.3. Inducing Prudence and IARA. From The-
orem 5, agents are motivated by an increasingly
uncertain environment whenever the firm offers com-
pensation plans which induce a prudent attitude
toward output. The following measure of the degree
of prudence was recently proposed as a direct ana-
logue of the degree of absolute risk aversion, DU =
−U ′′′w/U ′w (see Modica and Scarsini 2005).18 The
next result shows how a firm can preserve or reverse
the agent’s prudent preferences for wealth into pref-
erences for output. Imprudence toward output can
be induced by offering a compensation plan which
preserves the risk-averse attitude of the agent toward
money, but with the inverse reward q = r−1 being
“more prudent” than the (prudent) utility U .
Proposition 7. Consider an agent with prudent util-
ity U rewarded with compensation plan r .
(a) If r is concave and prudent, then the agent exhibits
a prudent attitude toward sales, V .
(b) If r is convex, AU ≥ Aq , and DU ≤ Dq , then the
agent’s attitude toward sales, V , is imprudent.
From Remark 7, Proposition 7 can also be used to
induce IARA.
Example 4. Consider an agent with quadratic util-
ity function Uw= 4+w−w2/2, w ∈ 01. By offer-
ing a compensation plan rs=− ln1− s, the agent’s
induced value function is prudent, V ′′′s = −1 −
s−4 ≤ 0. Note that AU = 1−w−1 ≥ 1=Aq and Dq =
1≥ 0=DU .
Proposition 7 gives only sufficient conditions for
compensation plans to induce prudent/imprudent
preferences for sales. In special cases, other methods
to induce prudence are conceivable, as illustrated in
the following example:
Example 5. The compensation plan rs = es in-
duces prudence from an agent with utility function
Uw= ln1+w. Indeed, V ′′′s= 1+eses1−es≤ 0.
However, AU = 1+w−1 ≤w−1 =Aq .
6. The Agent’s Dynamic Problem
In the following, we extend the single-period model
of §2 to a dynamic setting. The agent chooses in each
18 An alternative, widely accepted measure is PU =−U ′′′w/U ′′w.
period how much effort to exert by trading off an
immediate effort cost with the utility of variable com-
pensation. The latter is administered at the end of
the sales horizon, contingent on cumulative output.
The multiperiod model allows us to obtain motiva-
tional patterns with respect to two factors underlying
the agent’s intertemporal value function, namely, past
performance and time to evaluation. We show that
agents with concave value functions are demotivated
by past successes and longer sales horizons. These
predictions are reversed for agents with convex value
functions.
Let st denote the agent’s accumulated output up
to time t, calculated recursively as st+1 = st + Sxt,
t = 1    N − 1. Sales are assumed to be i.i.d. over
time; all results easily extend for Markovian sales pro-
cesses.19 For given accumulated sales st at time t, the





t = 0    N − 1 (5)
where the terminal valuation is VN sN  = V sN . De-
note Wtst xt= ƐVt+1st +Sxt−Cxt.
Certain properties of the agent’s terminal prefer-
ences for cumulative sales, captured by V , are pre-
served over time by the value function at time t, Vts.
Proposition 8. If the agent’s terminal value for sales
V is increasing, convex, respectively, concave, then the
time-t value function, Vts, is also increasing, convex,
respectively, concave in s for all t.
Preservation of risk preferences in a dynamic set-
ting, particularly risk aversion, is a nontrivial result.
In contrast, other properties such as prudence, aggres-
siveness, or monotone risk aversion are not robust
in a dynamic setting (they are not preserved through
the maximization operator; see Smith and McCardle
2002).
6.1. Past Performance and Time to Evaluation
The agent’s cumulative output at any point in time,
as well as the time remaining until evaluation, impact
his optimal choice of effort, but in opposite ways. For
agents with risk-averse preferences, we show that bet-
ter output makes them lazy. Specifically, the better
their achieved performance at any given point in time,
the less effort they will undertake, ceteris paribus.
On the other hand, getting closer to evaluation time
acts as a motivator (these agents procrastinate). The
closer the agent is from bonus time, the more effort
he undertakes, given a certain output level. Agents
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Figure 4 Optimal Effort vs. Past Performance and Time to Evaluation
Under Risk-Averse  = 09, Respectively, Risk-Seeking
= 11 Sales Preferences V s = s; Cx = x2, Sx =
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with risk-seeking sales preferences exhibit the oppo-
site behavior: they are motivated by higher output
levels and longer horizons.
Theorem 6. The optimal level of effort for agents with
a concave value function V decreases with accumulated
output at any given time, and with the time remaining
until evaluation. That is, x∗t s is decreasing in s for any
given t and x∗t+1s≥ x∗t s for any given level of past per-
formance s and at any time t. The opposite is true for
agents with convex value function V .
The behavior prescribed by this result is com-
monly observed in practice. Lal and Srinivasan (1993,
pp. 777–778) mention that “it is not unusual to hear
about sales people spending time playing golf or
indulging in other activities if their past efforts have
been unusually successful.” The opposite behavior
is rational if firms offer convex compensation plans
which induce a risk-seeking attitude (see Proposi-
tion 6). Figure 4 illustrates the insights of Theorem 6
over a four-period horizon T = 4.
7. Conclusion
This paper characterizes the motivational drivers
and patterns of a risk-averse agent who chooses an
optimal level of effort to trade off performance-based
payoff with disutility of effort. Our approach is dif-
ferent from the bulk of the compensation literature,
which focuses on a principal-agent framework. In this
context, the agent’s contract is assumed to change
(optimally for the firm) with respect to factors affect-
ing his decision. Such an approach obscures the direct
impact of given compensation structures on effort,
particularly on the short run when contracts are usu-
ally fixed. To isolate this effect, we focused on the
agent’s problem in response to fixed contracts. We
obtained comparative statics that quantify managers’
rational behavior under very general forms of output,
reward, and utility functions.
The insights that we obtained are robust, and sur-
prisingly, different from those obtained under princi-
pal-agent frameworks. We identified what properties
of the agent’s utility function and the reward plan
impact effort. In contrast with previous results, we
showed that less risk-averse agents do not necessar-
ily work harder, but those with higher marginal value
of wealth do. We also showed that higher rewards
do not necessarily motivate, and actually demotivate
so-called conservative agents. Firms who expect to
use changes in compensation as a lever to motivate
managers should employ an aggressive workforce.
In the second part of this paper, we showed how
factors that impact output act as indirect drivers of
the managers’ effort. These results typically require
additional conditions on the agent’s value function for
output (the utility of compensation); interestingly, the
conditions that we identify are in contrast with results
in the salesforce agency literature. For example, we
found that the agent’s and the firm’s productivity are
motivating factors for agents with an induced aggres-
sive (and, in particular, risk-seeking) attitude. These
agents are also motivated by larger market sizes. On
the other hand, agents with prudent attitudes toward
output are motivated by increased market risk.
In a dynamic setting, we showed that the agent’s
induced risk preferences for output are preserved
over time through the iterations of the dynamic pro-
gram. This enabled us to trace the agent’s motivation
in response to past performance and time to eval-
uation, back to his risk preferences for output. Our
results are summarized in Table 1.
In particular, our results highlight the importance
for firms to identify and elicit various properties of
employees’ preferences such as prudence, aggressive-
ness, and risk aversion to understand motivational
patterns. This opens up new directions for empir-
ical investigation. It would be interesting to inves-
tigate how these motivational patterns may change
when accounting for judgmental biases in the agent’s
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Table 1 Output Preferences Insuring Systematic (De)motivation from
Increasing a Critical Factor
Critical factor Demotivating Motivating
Firm’s productivity Conservative Aggressive
Agent’s productivity Conservative and IARA Aggressive
Past performance Concave Convex
Time to evaluation Concave Convex
Market size Concave Convex
Market variability Imprudent Prudent
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Appendix. Proofs
We only prove one part of a proposition when the second
part is analogous. For simplicity of exposition, the proofs
assume differentiability of the functions involved. However,
all the results can be extended, using finite differences, to
allow for the nondifferentiability of r , and consequently, V .
Proof of Remark 1. Let /s = s − rs, so x =
/Sx. The first part follows because Sx is stochasti-
cally increasing in x, so an increasing function thereof /
will also be stochastically increasing. Conversely, assume by
contradiction that there exist s1 < s2 such that /s1 > /s2.
Consider the increasing sales function Sx ≡ s1 for x < x0
and Sx≡ s2 otherwise. Hence, the firm’s profit is x=
/s1 for x < x0 and x = /s2 for x ≥ x0. This is not
stochastically increasing in x, a contradiction.
Proof of Remarks 2, 3, and 4. It is equivalent to prove
the results for the agent with utility function Uw =
Uw/F , F > 0. In this case, Rx" = Ɛ U1+ ṽsxY ,
where ṽs = vs/F . Monotonicity of sxy and ṽs in x
and s, respectively, implies in each case Rx"x" ≥ 0, as
detailed below. From Lemma 1, this shows that x∗" is
increasing in ".
For Remark 1: Rx"x"= Ɛe−"−11+ṽsxY"−2ṽ′sxY ·
sxxY"−11+ ṽsxY− 1≥ 0.
For Remark 2: Rx"x" = Ɛṽ′sxYsxxY1 + ṽ ·
sxY"
−1
1+ ln1+ ṽsxY≥ 0.
For Remark 3: Rx"x" = Ɛe−#1+ṽsxY#ṽ′sxYsx ·
xY≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 1. Because U2 −U1 is increasing, for
Z2 FSD Z1, we can write
ƐU2Z2−U1Z2≥ ƐU2Z1−U1Z1
In particular, for Zj ≡ rsxjY, j = 12, we have Z2 FSD Z1,
whenever x2 ≥ x1. This implies supermodularity of Rx i=
ƐUirsxY in x i. From Lemma 1, x∗2 ≥ x∗1 .
To prove the converse, assume by contradiction that there
exists w2 > w1 such that a1 = U2w2 − U2w1 < U1w2 −
U1w1= a2. Let x0 > 0 such that Cx0 ∈ a1 a2; this exists
because C spans 0.20 Let s1 = qw1 < s2 = qw2, where
q = r−1. Consider the deterministic sales function sxy= s2
if x ≥ x0 and sxy= s1 for x < x0. Because C is increasing,
20 Note that this assumption could be relaxed to C spanning the
same domain as U .
it follows that x∗i ∈ 0x0. Because C0 = 0, and Cx0 ∈
U2w2−U2w1U1w2−U1w1 by definition, we obtain
that W1x0 > W10 and W2x0 < W20. Hence, x∗1 = x0 >
0= x∗2 , a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 1. From Lemma 1, it is sufficient
to show that U ′′F +vsV ′ssx ≤ 0, which follows from the
concavity of U , and monotonicity of sxy and vs.
Proof of Proposition 2. Because U 	r2−U 	r1 is increas-
ing, for Z2 FSD Z1, we can write
ƐU r2Z2−Ur1Z2≥ ƐU r2Z1−Ur1Z1
In particular, for Zi = sxiY we have Z2 FSD Z1 whenever
x2 ≥ x1. Hence, Rx i = ƐU risxY is supermodular
in x i. From Lemma 1, x∗2 ≥ x∗1 .
The proof of the necessity part follows the same lines as
Theorem 1 by assuming that there exists w2 >w1 such that
a1 =Ur2w2−Ur2w1 < Ur1w2−Ur1w1= a2.
Proof of Theorem 2. From the concavity of U , if r2 ≤ r1
and r ′2 ≥ r ′1, then U ′r2r ′2 − U ′r1r ′1 ≥ 0, which implies U 	
r2−U 	 r1 is increasing.
Conversely, for risk-neutral agents with Ux = x, the
result implies, via Proposition 2, that r2− r1 is increasing. It
remains to show that r2s≤ r1s for all achievable sales val-
ues s. Let a > 0 such that s < q1a q2a. Consider the agent
with piecewise-linear increasing concave utility Uax = x
for x ≤ a and Uax= a for x > a. For s′ =maxq1a q2a,
Proposition 2 implies
r2s− r1s = Uar2s−Uar1s≤Uar2s′−Uar1s′
= a− a= 0
ProofofTheorem3. The first part follows from Lemma 1
and Definition 2. The proof of the converse follows the same
lines as that of Theorem 1 by assuming that w2 > w1 exist
such that a2 =U2w2−U2w1 > U1w2−U1w1= a1.
Proof of Remark 6. (a) If U ′′w + h ≥ 0, R U w =





U ′w+h ≤ 1
where the second inequality follows from RU ≤ 1.
(b) BecauseU conservative impliesU concave (Remark 5),







where the first inequality follows from IARA and the sec-
ond from RU ≥ 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. Follows from Remark 6 and
Theorem 3.
Proof of Proposition 4. From Lemma 1, it is sufficient
to show that Rx = ƐV minSx  is supermodular
in x . For arbitrary fixed 2 ≥ 1, if V is increasing, 5z=
V minz 2 − V minz 1 is increasing in z. Because
Sx2 FSD Sx1, for all x2 ≥ x1, Ɛ5Sx2 ≥ Ɛ5Sx1,
which is equivalent to the supermodularity of Rx.
Proof of Proposition 5. The results for the firm’s,
respectively, the agent’s productivity follow the same lines
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Proof of Proposition 6. (a) Letting w= rs, we obtain
U ′w= V ′qwq′w (7)
U ′′w= V ′′qwq′w2+V ′qwq′′w (8)
From (7) and (8), we obtain
V ′′qwq′w2 =U ′wAq −AU
Because U is increasing, V is convex iff AU ≤Aq . In partic-
ular, if log q′/U ′ is concave, then AU ≤Aq .






This is less than unity if AU ≤ q′/q+Aq . In particular, RV ≤ 1
if r is convex (q is concave, soAq ≥ 0) andAU ≤ q′/q. Note that
AU ≤ q′/q + Aq is equivalent to log q′/qU ′′ ≤ 0, i.e., q′/qU ′
logconcave. Furthermore, AU ≤ q′/q if log 1/qU ′′ ≤ 0.
Proof of Theorem 4. Because V is concave, for any x2 >
x1, 5z = V sx2 + z − V sx1 + z is decreasing in z.
Hence, by first-order dominance, Ɛ5Y2 ≤ Ɛ5Y1
for all 2 ≥ 1. This shows submodularity of Rx =
ƐV sx+Y in x . From Lemma 1, x∗ is decreas-
ing in .
For the necessity part, assume, by contradiction, that
there exists w2 >w1, such that hw2 > hw1, where hw=
Uw+ x0−Uw, x0 ≥ 0. Let Y1 ≡w1 and Y2 ≡w2, so that
Y2 FSD Y1. The proof follows the same construction as The-
orem 1, with a2 = ƐU Y2 + x0 − UY2 > ƐU Y1 + x0 −
UY1= a1.
Proof of Example 3. Letting s∗py = sx∗p py,









1− ex ≥ 0
hence, s∗py is increasing in p.
Proof of Theorem 5. Because V s exhibits prudence,
5z = V sx2 + z − V sx1 + z is convex in z for
x2 ≥ x1. From Y2 CX Y1, for 2 ≥ 1, it follows that
Ɛ5Y2 ≥ Ɛ5Y1. This implies supermodularity of
Rx= ƐV sx+ Y in x . From Lemma 1, it fol-
lows that x∗ is increasing in .
For the necessity part, assume by contradiction that for
hw=Uw+ x0−Uw, x0 ≥ 0, there exists w1, w2,  such
that hw > hw1+ 1− hw2.21 Let Y1 ≡w and Y2 ≡
w1( 1− w2, so that Y2 CX Y1. The proof follows a
similar construction as for Theorem 1, with a2 = ƐU Y1 +
x0−UY1 > ƐU Y2+ x0−UY2= a1.
Proof of Proposition 7. (a) Because U ′′′w≥ 0, r ′′s≤
0, and r ′′′s≥ 0,
V ′′′s = U ′′′rsr ′s3+ 3U ′′rsr ′sr ′′s
+U ′rsr ′′′s≥ 0 (10)
21 To simplify notation, we denote x = x1+ 1−x2 for any x1, x2
and any scalar .
(b) Letting w= rs, we obtain
V ′′′qwq′w3+ 3V ′′qwq′wq′′w
+V ′qwq′′′w=U ′′′w (11)
From (7), (8), and (11), we can write
V ′′′qwq′w3 =U ′wDU −Dq− 3AqAU −Aq
From AU ≥Aq , DU ≤Dq , and Aq ≥ 0 (by convexity of r), we
obtain V ′′′s≤ 0.
Proof of Proposition 8. Monotonicity is trivially pre-
served by induction. Preservation of convexity is also
proved by induction. Convexity of Vt+1 implies for any s1, s2,
ƐVt+1s1+Sx+ 1− Vt+1s2+Sx−Cx
≥ ƐVt+1s+Sx−Cx
which is equivalent to the convexity of Wtst xt. Hence,
Vtst=maxWtst xt is convex in s.
Preserving concavity of Vt is slightly more involved, as
it requires joint concavity of Wt . For any si, xi, i = 12 we
have
Vt+1s1+ sx1y+ 1− Vt+1s2+ sx2y−C
≤ Vt+1s+ sxy−C
≤ Vt+1s+ sx y−C
≤ Vt+1s+ sx y−Cx
where the first inequality follows from the concavity of Vt+1,
the second from the concavity of sxy in x, and the third
from the convexity of Cx. Taking expectations, with x1, x2
denoting the optimal decisions at time t at sales level s1, s2,
we obtain
Vts1+ 1− Vts2





Proof of Theorem 6. We first prove the results with
respect to past performance. Let s2 ≥ s1, and define 5z=
Vt+1s2+ z−Vt+1s1+ z, which is decreasing from the con-
cavity of Vt+1s. Because Sx2 FSD Sx1, for all x2 ≥ x1,
Ɛ5Sx1 ≥ Ɛ5Sx2. This implies submodularity of
Wtsx= ƐVt+1st +Sxt−Cxt in s x. Hence, x∗t s is
decreasing in s.




Because Sx≥ 0 and Vt+1 is concave, it follows that for any
action x, ƐVt+1z+Sx−Vt+1z is decreasing in z. Hence,
8z is decreasing.
First-order stochastic dominance implies Ɛ8Y1 ≥
Ɛ8Y2 whenever Y2 FSD Y1. In particular, for Yi = s +
Sxi, i = 12, we have Y2 FSD Y1 whenever x2 ≥ x1. This
shows thatWtsx= ƐVt+1st+Sxt−Cxt is supermod-
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